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It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data 
Farming Workshop is named after a 
farming implement. In farming, a 
scythe is used to clear and harvest. We 
hope that the “Scythe” will perform a 
similar role for our data farming 
community by being a tool to help 
prepare for our data farming efforts 
and harvest the results. The Scythe is 
provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu.  
Please contact the editors for 
additional paper copies.
Please let us know what you think of 
this third prototype issue. Articles, 
ideas for articles and material, and 
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International Data Farming Community
Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of 
Data Farming, its methodologies, applications, 
tools, and evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the 
biannual International Data Farming Workshops, 
where researchers participate in team-oriented 
model development, experimental design, and 
analysis using high performance computing 
resources... that is, Data Farming. 
Scythe, Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming Community, Issue 3a, 





International Data Farming Workshop 15 (IDFW 15) took place during the six days from November 11th through the 16th, 
2007  in Singapore.  Sixty-six participants from seven countries worked in eight different teams exploring questions using Data 
Farming methods.  The theme was “Cultivating Knowledge,” and the goal was to use our data farming methods to continue 
to explore our important questions.
Personnel from DSO National Laboratories in Singapore collaborated with us at the SEED Center for Data Farming at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in organizing the workshop.  The “SEED” in our title is an acronym for 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs.
As the executive director of the Center, it is my  pleasure to work with many from around the world to develop the methods 
of Data Farming and apply them to important questions of our day.  And on behalf of the co-directors of the SEED Center for 
Data Farming, Professors Tom Lucas and Susan Sanchez, I would like to express our thanks to DSO, the team leaders, the plenary 
speakers and all  of the participants in IDFW 15.
I want to also briefly outline the work of the eight teams and invite you to examine the details of their  efforts later in this 
issue of The Scythe.  This issue also contains a listing of the plenary sessions and concludes with an article on Clustering and 
Outlier Analysis for Data Mining. As always, the plenary session materials, in-briefs, and out-briefs from the Workshop are 
available online at harvest.nps.edu along with electonic copies of this issue of The Scythe. (Attendees will find an attached CD 
with this material as well as a collection of photographs from the week of the workshop.)
Team 1 applied Automated Red Teaming techniques developed at DSO to examine a Maritime scenario.  They also 
developed their work on automated co-evolution.  
The  objective of Team 2 was to develop civilian models within an agent-based simulation.  They used Pythagoras and 
explored factors related to the civilians through data farming.  
Team 3 used PAX to gain insight into specific aspects of peace support operations.  The scenario used in this team’s data 
farming at this workshop was based on a crowd control demonstration situation in a stabilization operation.  
Team 4 built on previous MANA simulation scenarios to continue to address issues involving improvised explosive devices. 
In particular, the value of adding unmanned aerial  systems with swarming behaviors to the operational environment was 
examined. 
1 - IDFW 15 - Overview
Team 5 applied the Fractional Factorial Controlled Sequential Bifurcation screening procedure to the Hierarchy 
organizational model and found some delightful surprises through their data farming. 
The Joint Test and Evaluation Methodology program provided the leadership for Team 6. This team applied design of 
experiments and data farming  techniques for planning tests in a joint mission environment.  
Team 7 explored questions involving critical infrastructure.  They used NetLogo to implement modeling of infrastrutures 
and interactions through network topology. 
And finally, Team 8 continued to enhance their  Combat Identification model in NetLogo. They were able to begin data 
farming at this workshop, but plan to reconsider some variables and consider new ones at future workshops 
IDFW 15 was our second international workshop in Singapore and it was once again a forum for abundant international 
collaboration.  We certainly owe a great deal of thanks to the organizers in Singapore, and in particular I would like to 
acknowledge Choo Chwee Seng and Ng Ee Chong from DSO for their efforts in coordinating the workshop.  We also owe thanks 
to the technical lead from the SEED Center for Data Farming, Steve Upton, as well as the many efforts of the co-directors of the 
SEED Center for Data Farming, Professors Tom Lucas and Susan Sanchez.  And one more thank you for a job well done goes to 
Ted Meyer for collecting and publishing the work in this issue of The Scythe.  Please note that Ted and I can be contacted at 
datafarming@verizon.net with questions, comments or suggestions.
Now looking ahead, our Data Farming community will be back in Monterey for our next workshop, International Data 
Farming Workshop 16.  It will  start with the opening dinner on Sunday 13 April, 2008 and continue through the week with the 
closing session on Friday 18 April.  We hope to see you there!
Gary Horne
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With shipping at the heart of the global economy, maritime 
security is required to ensure freedom of the seas and to 
facilitate freedom of navigation and commerce.  Faced with 
an array of threats from the terrorists and criminals, nations 
should stand united and share in the responsibility for 
maintaining maritime security.  In IDFW 15, our team will 
focus on anchorage protection and continue our works from 
IDFW 14.
AIM
This study aims to:
• Continue to evaluate the usefulness of Automated Red 
Teaming (ART)2 in Blue Ops Planning.
• Gather feedback for development of Automated Co-
Evolution (ACE) framework
BACKGROUND
Initial Scenario Set-up.  In this baseline scenario, the Blue 
forces conducted patrols to guard against threats on 
anchorage.  There were several commercial ships anchored 
in the protected area.  The Red forces will attempt to 
penetrate the Blue defense and inflict damages on the 
anchored vessels, using various approaches.  Any damages 
to the commercial shipping will deal a severe psychological 
blow to the Blue defense force.  The initial set-up of 
experiment was as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Baseline Blue/Red Plans
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The following key assumptions were made for this scenario:
Area of Operations (AO).  The AO was assumed to be an 
anchorage in open waters away from the sea lines of 
communications (SLOC) and main shipping traffic.  As such, 
the neutral shipping was not modeled.  
Environmental Conditions.  It was assumed that the 
operations were conducted in dark hours with favorable 
weather conditions and sea state.  
Communication Links.  The Blue force was assumed to 
have full communication link and perfect IKC2.  As for the 
Red force, it was assumed that the individual boats were 
operating in accordance to mission plans with full 
communication links.
KEY MODELING PARAMETERS
Blue Forces.  The blue force consisted of three patrol vessels 
(PVs).  The following modeling parameters were assumed.
• Patrol Vessels.  Each PVs was assumed to conduct 
normal patrol at 8 knots and give chase at a maximum 
speed of 16 knots.  The PVs were also assumed to be 
capable of neutralizing the Red boats by closing in 
within 2 nm.  The dynamics of the close water combat 
was not modeled.  A summary of the key 
specifications of the Blue PVs was as follows:
PV Speed [Patrol] (knots) 8
PV Speed [Chase] (knots) 16
PV Detection Range (nm) 6
PV Identification (ID) Range (nm) 2
Table 1: Specifications of Blue PVs
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1 For more information contact: CPT Sim Wee Chung, toonsim@yahoo.com.sg
2 ART was developed by DSO-ORL to find an optimal solution for individual sides in a two-sided scenario, using evolutionary algorithms
• Red Forces.  The Red boats were modeled as small 
fishing boats with a maximum speed of 16 knots and 
loaded with explosives.  These boats were assumed to 
be without any onboard sensors and have a detection 
and identification range of 2 nm.  
Maximum Speed (knots) 16
Detection/ID Range (nm) 2
Table 2: Specifications of Red Boats
• Neutral Commercial Shipping.  The neutral 
commercial ships in the anchorage were assumed to 
be anchored.  
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The MOE was:
• Number of Successful Red attacks on Neutral 
Commercial Shipping
• Mean Red Attrition
• Mean Neutral Shipping Destroyed
METHODOLOGY
Manual Teaming
Blue vs Red.  The team members were divided into 2 groups 
to refine both Blue and Red plans.  This was meant to 
simulate realistic ops planning with minimum intelligence 
inputs.  Both groups underwent several rounds of 
deliberations and fine-tuning before finalizing their plans. 
We also captured some of the interim plans to facilitate 
discussions for the subsequent ACE framework.  
Blue Team
Enhanced Inner Patrol.  The blue team decided to 
concentrate own forces within the anchorage area to provide 
a more responsive and all-round protection on the anchored 
shipping.  A broad deployment concept for the enhanced 
Blue patrol plan was as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Manual Blue Plan
Red Team
Saturation Strategy.  The red team decided to fully utilize 
their numerical advantage and launch a simultaneous attack 
on the anchorage area to saturate the Blue forces.   A 
schematic of the red attack plan was as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Manual Red Plan
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Blue ART Tactics
Multiple-layered Defence Strategy.  The ART-generated Blue 
plan surprised the team initially with a tactic that seemingly 
made little operational sense to deploy.  It took the team a 
while to decipher and understand the plan better.  The ART 
tactic suggested two border patrols at the northern and 
southern edge of the anchorage area while the last patrol 
vessel deployed in a  crossover patrol pattern to achieve a 
multiple-layered defence strategy.  The ART-generated Blue 
plan was as shown in Figure 4 below.
 
Figure 4: ART Blue Tactics
Red ART Tactics
Simultaneous Pin-point Attack.  Similar to the Manual Red 
Attack Plan, the ART-generated tactic proposed a 
simultaneous red attack towards the centre of the anchorage 
area with re-attack flexibilities.  This would cater for  cases 
where the anchored vessels were dispersed nearer to the 
anchorage edges.  The ART tactic for the red team was as 
shown in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5: ART Red Tactics
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ART Complements Manual Teaming
From the results below in Table 1, it was evident that there 
was marked improvement in all 3 MOEs for the manual blue 
and red plans after evolving the intangibles using the ART 
framework.  In addition, the ART-generated Blue tactics 
produced a significant 98% drop in red mission success and 
a 99% drop in neutral shipping attrition.  As for the ART-
generated Red attack plan, the results also showed a drop of 
83%in red attrition and 105% increase in the mean number of 
neutral shipping destroyed.  We could therefore conclude 
from all the above observations that ART not only 
complemented the manual teaming efforts, it also provided 
alternate plans for considerations, which might otherwise, be 
overlooked or non-intuitive.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Automated Red Teaming
Through the exercise during IDFW 15, several valuable 
feedbacks were received from the team members.  
Title is misleading.  Firstly, some of the team members 
found the title “ART” misleading as it seemed to suggest a 
fully automated process to optimize against multiple plans. 
This would actually be 
addressed in the ACE 
framework.  In addition 
some team members had 
the impression that ART 
could only be used to 
optimize red plans to 
generate the worst-case 
scenarios for the blue plans. 
Instead, ART was developed 
as a tool to optimize 
individual sides in two-
sided scenarios, using 
evolutionary algorithms.
Surprises from ART. 
Secondly, it was interesting 
to note that the ART had 
produced plans that were 
non-intuitive and might not 
make much operational sense.  This led to remarks like 
“well..  it could be an art itself to decipher ART generated 
tactics.” and “what a surprise!”.  Nonetheless, ART could be 
applied to generate alternate plans that might not be intuitive 
but effective.  
Useful Tool to Complement Manual Ops Planning. 
Finally, the team members found ART as a useful tool to 
complement manual ops planning.  This is consistent with our 
findings from the last workshop and further strengthens our 
belief in the applications of the ART framework.  
Automated Co-Evolution
During IDFW 15, the team had lengthy and in depth 
discussions on some of the challenges ACE would faced in 
its development.  Below was the list of questions raised 
during the discussions: 
• How to choose the fittest solution for multiple 
objectives optimization?
• What if Blue and Red Teams had different end 
objectives? 
• How to achieve optimization for multiple-sided 
scenarios?
The ACE development team would take into 
considerations the above challenges to add robustness in the 
ACE framework.  
CONCLUSIONS
This study has discussed some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the ART framework.  Despite its limitations, 
the ART framework is highly recommended to be used to 
complement ops planning efforts.  In addition the report has 
also discussed about potential challenges of the ACE 
framework.  
LOOKING AHEAD
The team will be continuing our effort on the development 
of the Automated Co-Evolution (ACE) framework.  
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Baseline Blue Plan Red Plan BlueART Red ARTManual ART Manual ART
Aggressiveness -60 -60 74 -60 -14 -22 -4
Cohesiveness -100 -100 -50 -100 -40 85 -16
Determination 60 60 9 60 33 -58 45
Red Mission Success 100% 82% 45% 100% 100% 2% 100%
Red Attrition 2.77 3.98 4.48 1.96 1.83 4.97 0.48
Neutral Attrition 2.21 1.06 0.52 3.05 3.15 0.03 4.52
% Drop
(Red Mission Success) - 16% 55% 0% 0% 98% 0%
% Increase
(Red Attrition) - 44% 80% (29%) (34%) 79% (83%)
% Drop
( Neutral Attrition) - 52% 76% (38%) (43%) 99% (105%)
Table 1: Summary of Results
Team 2
Team 1
Team 2: Representing the Civilian Population 
in Urban Stability Operations
TEAM 2 MEMBERS
Jerry Pearman
Training and Doctrine Analysis Center (TRAC), US
Jonathan Alt, Major1
United States Army
Training and Doctrine Analysis Center (TRAC), US
Todd Ferris, Major
United States Marine Corps
Naval Postgraduate School, US
Tiah Yao Ming
DSO National Laboratories, Singapore
Thorsten Seitz, Commander
German Navy
Naval Postgraduate School, US 
INTRODUCTION
Armed forces across the globe are conducting stability 
operations to establish enduring political systems in former 
crisis regions.  A goal of stability operations is to influence 
civilian attitudes in favor of the host nation (HN) 
government and the stabilization forces.  To better 
understand the dynamics of civilian attitudes, experts have 
developed analytic models to represent civilian behaviors 
and reactions to changes in the cultural and societal 
landscape.  Further research is required to integrate concepts 
from various analytic models to explore the complexity of 
civilian behaviors.  Our team’s goal for IDFW 15 was to 
develop rudimentary agent-based simulation models of 
civilian behaviors that integrate concepts from selected 
analytic models.   
The work conducted at IDFW 15 extends research led by 
the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Analysis 
Center (TRAC) in Monterey to develop simulation models 
representing complex social environments.  The intent of the 
simulation models is to assess the effect of societal events on 
populace behavior.  Such events include diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic (DIME) factors.  When 
provided with a set of DIME inputs, the simulation model 
proposes likely responses by the civilian populace. 
The simulation model developers used concepts derived 
from analytic models across the fields of sociology, economics, 
and international relations to support simulation 
development.  Specifically, the simulation model developers 
used data and algorithms from analytic models to represent 
complex social interactions and networks.  Complex 
interactions and networks are critical when attempting to 
explain the effect of events (inputs) on civilian behavior 
(outputs). Additionally, analytic models provided well-
defined measures of effectiveness easily captured in the agent-
based simulation models.  
TEAM 2 OBJECTIVES
Team objectives included:
• Developing rudimentary civilian models in an agent-
based simulation.
• Exploring factors for data farming related to civilian 
modeling. 
Scoping the problem required the team to determine 
which sectors of the population to represent in the simulation 
model.  The intent was to model a cross section of the 
population that would generate heterogeneous responses to 
events.  For instance, populations from diverse religious 
backgrounds, or sects within the same major religion, often 
respond differently to certain events.  Based on research citing 
the influence of tribal bonds in our area of interest, the team 
modeled three tribes.  Each tribe contained subordinate clan 
and family members.  To achieve disparate responses to 
events, the simulation model aligns one tribe with the HN, the 
second tribe with the insurgency, and represents the third 
tribe as neutral.       
A challenge for the team was to develop a methodology 
for mapping concepts proposed in the analytic models to the 
simulation models.  First, team members researched 
applicable analytic models of civilian behavior appropriate for 
our study.   Next, we identified concepts from the analytic 
models deemed viable for representation in the simulation. 
For IDFW 15, the team selected Pythagoras, a low resolution 
agent-based simulation, as the platform to build the civilian 
model.  Pythagoras provides a flexible development 
environment that directly supports many of the concepts 
proposed in the analytic models.  
ANALYTIC MODELS
The team implemented concepts from three analytic models.  
Civilian Attitude Model
An analytic model developed by professors P.A. Jacobs, et al 
describes the change in population attitude toward the HN 
due to HN and insurgency (I) actions2.  The model shows 
how perceived good and bad actions sum over time.  The 
measure of effectiveness (MOE), attitude toward the HN at 
time t + h, is defined in Equation 1.
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1 For more information contact: Major Jonathan Alt, jkalt@nps.edu
2 Jacobs, P.A., D.P. Gaver, M. Kress, R. Szechtman.  A Model for the Effect of Host Nation/Insurgency Operations on a Population 
(Draft).  Naval Postgraduate School, October 2007.
 Equation 1: Measurement of Effectiveness
An example of a good HN action may be job 
opportunity; or conversely lack of job opportunity may be 
perceived as a bad HN action.  Terrorist activity may be 
perceived as a bad insurgency action, whereas enhanced 
security to a region by insurgents may be perceived as good 
insurgent action.  Numerous DIME-related actions could 
impact the MOE.  The simulation model developed during 
the workshop included only one type of action, an 
informational/media event.  The model simulates HN and 
insurgent media broadcasts that affect the tribes’ attitude 
toward the HN.  
Modeling attitude change and media events in 
Pythagoras proved relatively straightforward.  Pythagoras 
provides a robust sidedness capability using color schemes 
that enable the user to define friendly, enemy, and neutral 
agents.  In this case, we assigned each agent within a tribe an 
initial level of ‘blueness’  depending on their (friendly) 
alignment with the HN.  The HN and insurgent media events 
impact each agent’s blueness differently depending on their 
alignment (or lack of alignment) with the HN.  An agent’s 
color endstate depicts its attitude toward the HN at t + h and 
serves as our primary MOE.  
The last parameter in the Civilian Attitude Model -
influence of other subpopulations – addresses the effect of 
social networks on attitudes.  For instance, two families may 
belong to different tribes yet influence each other due to 
common bonds, such as religious sect.  Our research shows 
that multiple analytic models include social network 
influences when describing civilian behavior.  The following 
section addresses an analytic model focused on social 
networks and our methodology for mapping its concepts to a 
simulation model.  
Social Networks Model
Professor Deborah Gibbons developed an analytic model 
that helps describe civilian responses to social network 
factors3.  Although the model addresses a cross section of 
social structures impacting civilian behavior, the team 
narrowed our focus to her discussion of communications. 
Specifically, Gibbons highlights three parameters that affect 
communications as related to civilian behavior:  message 
content, message source and receiver, and hierarchy.  We 
determined that Pythagoras supports these communication 
parameters to varying degrees and mapped them to the 
simulation model.  
Pythagoras enables communication between agents by 
assigning like communication devices to two or more agents. 
Agents with like devices exchange message information each 
time step.  Message content in Pythagoras consists strictly of 
the sender’s location, sidedness, leadership status, resources 
(supply status), and attributes (user defined quantities).  For 
our purposes, we defined communication hierarchy as intra-
tribe and inter-tribe communications, as illustrated in Figure 
1.  The extent that message content and hierarchy impact the 
MOE remains uncertain and highlights the importance of 
integrating multiple analytic concepts into a common 
simulation model.     
Figure 1: Social Networks Communication Model
Economic Model
Professor Robert McNab developed an analytic model 
tailored to economic factors that affect civilian behavior in 
unstable regions4.  The model describes economic decisions 
by the HN that impact family resources and help form 
attitudes.  Economic decisions by the HN include wage 
controls, tax rates, employment opportunities in the 
production sector, and employment opportunities in the 
soldiering sector.  The dynamics of these decisions force 
families to seek resources by participating in production, 
soldiering, or insurrection.  Families pay penalties for 
participation in soldiering or insurrection due to the risks 
involved with those activities.  Unlike the two analytic 
models described above, McNab’s model does not consider 
the effects of social networks.
To implement concepts from McNab’s model, the team 
utilized Pythagoras’ ability to expend and resupply agent 
resources.  The simulation model decrements family 
resources each time step to simulate daily expenditures. 
Once resources fall below a user-defined risk threshold, 
families seek additional resources from production, 
soldiering, or insurrection, as depicted in Figure 2.  Families 
aligned with the HN (tribe 1) prefer participation in 
soldiering, whereas families aligned with the insurgents (tribe 
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4 McNab, Robert.  A Model of Insurrections.  Naval Postgraduate School.  
2) seek resources from insurrection sponsored activities.  Non-
aligned families (tribe 3) prefer resources from the production 
sector.  
Occasionally, the sources of income experience depleted 
funds and cannot support customer needs.  If insufficient 
resources exist at the preferred source, families turn toward 
alternate sources of income.  For instance, if a  family from 
tribe 3 becomes unemployed from their factory job, they seek 
income from either soldiering or insurrection activities.
To link the economic concepts implemented in the 
simulation model with our overall MOE, attitude toward HN, 
we impart color attribute changes on   families based on their 
source of income.  Specifically, when a family receives 
resources from the soldiering sector, their blue color attribute 
increases and they become more aligned with the HN. 
Conversely, income from insurgent activities decreases 
blueness, driving families away from the HN.  The production 
sector  moves color attributes toward a neutral spectrum, 
pushing families toward a more neutral stance.             
Figure 2: Economic Resources Model
PYTHAGORAS SCENARIO
The team developed the scenario mindful that changes in 
civilian attitudes and behaviors often require months or 
years.  Given these timelines, the scenario simulates one year 
of media and economic activity with each time step 
representing one day (hence 365 time steps).  In general, the 
scenario simulates one year of media and economic events 
impacting the attitudes of three tribes linked socially, both 
internally and externally.   
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
One of our team objectives included exploring factors for 
data farming related to civilian modeling.  Limitations 
impacting factor selection include simulation capabilities, 
events modeled, and the scenario.  Given available factors, 
an analyst should then consider which factors may affect 
selected MOEs.  In this case, we selected the following 
factors:
• Rate of HN media broadcasts
• Rate of insurgent media broadcasts
• Instances of tribes/clans/families
• Vulnerability to media events
• Vulnerability tolerance to media event
These factors proved viable for exploring cause and effect 
relationships in civilian modeling.  
Once we selected experimental factors and identified 
levels for each factor, we inputted factors and levels into a 
Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design to 
determine design points.  We executed 30 replications of each 
design point on the German high performance computing 
cluster (HPCC), then analyzed results.   
RESULTS
Team 2 analyzed results for one experiment during the 
workshop.  Due to the incremental development process of 
the simulation model, the experiment included media 
events, but no economic events.  Factors for this experiment 
included rate of HN media broadcasts, rate of insurgent 
media broadcasts, and instances of tribes.  The NOLH 
returned 125 design points for the factors and levels 
described in this experiment.  
We analyzed the MOE, attitude toward the HN, by tribe. 
The data analysis model included linear regression and 
regression tree techniques.   The linear regression models 
showed no significant interactions between the factors. 
Regression trees provided both intuitive and non-intuitive 
results for main factors.  
• Intuitively, the rate of HN media broadcasts had the 
greatest impact on the MOE across each tribe.  In other 
words, as the rate of HN media events increased, 
tribal attitudes toward the HN improved.  
• Interestingly, tribe 1  results indicate that when media 
events target the most vulnerable populations within 
the tribe, attitudes toward the HN across the entire 
tribe improved significantly.
• Surprisingly, tribe 2 results show that instances of tribe 
1 members affect tribe 2 attitudes.  Inter-tribe social 
networking between tribes 1 and 2 may have 
contributed to this result, requiring further analysis.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our team’s contribution represents a starting point to further 
extend simulation model research of civilian behaviors.  The 
intuitive results from our experiment provide a measure of 
validity for the simulation model.  Mapping additional 
concepts from analytic models into the simulation model 
will enable more detailed study of the complex interactions 
affecting civilian behaviors.
Recommendations for further research include:
• Executing experiments using media vulnerability 
factors described above.
• Completing development of economic concepts 
implemented in the simulation model.
• Improving the social networks concepts implemented 
in the simulation model.  The latest version of 
Pythagoras will enable more detailed modeling of 
social networks.
TRAC-Monterey and NPS thesis students will continue to 
evolve civilian behavior research.  The target date for the next 
iteration of the simulation model is IDFW 16.    
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School of Computer Engineering – NTU, Singapore
INTRODUCTION
The Peace Support Operations Team at International Data 
Farming Workshop 15 used the simulation system "PAX" to 
gain insight into specific aspects of peace support 
operations.
PAX focuses on tactical miniature scenarios in the context 
of peace support missions. Both military expertise and 
empirical findings from psychological research on aggression 
were used in the design of PAX. Psychological factors having 
an influence on the decisions and the behavior of all persons 
concerned may have a considerable effect on the development 
of an operation.
PAX concentrates on modeling peace support operations 
on a detailed tactical level. Since being of secondary interest in 
the question sets examined, terrain is modeled in a fairly 
abstract way in a grid-based environment with a distinction 
between normal cells, built-up cells and obstacles. Due to its 
nature and objectives, the model focuses on the detailed 
representation of the individual civilians and their internal 
states, including emotions such as fear or anger and their 
interrelation. The military forces modeled in PAX, on the other 
hand, have the possibility to not only use different types of 
weapons, as in existing military simulations, but to also take 
measures of active de-escalation, such as trying to calm down 
people or talking to the leader of a civilian group.
The current PAX version 3.0 provides the military analyst 
with means to examine question sets in a variety of easy to set 
up PSO scenarios. Thus, the main goals in the development of 
this "Toolbox PAX" were to make the model flexible enough to 
be used in a broad variety of scenarios, examining different 
aspects of PSO missions, while at the same time keeping the 
user interface easy and intuitive enough for the military 
expert to use it without an excessive introduction.
Scenario
The scenario examined during the workshop was based on a 
crowd control "Demonstration" situation in a stabilization 
operation. Different options for the military side should be 
discussed and analyzed.
The situation was considered to consist of the following 
elements:
• An event organized by political-religious party A is 
taking place in a  town hall in the center of a town 
predominantly inhabited and controlled by party B. The 
event is scheduled and expected to end at 1000.
• PAXFOR intelligence reports:
o A group of rather extremist counter-demonstrators, 
who are known for their aggressive behavior, is 
expected to approach the city hall around 0945 after 
the end of another event organized by party B. This 
countermarch is announced and approved by the 
local forces. 
o A group of rather aggressive young adults 
sympathizing with party B is also expected to 
approach the city hall around 0930. They are known 
for their dislike against members of party A. While 
they are not expected to immediately show open 
aggression, this may change especially when aroused 
or intoxicated. They are not expected to sympathize 
with PAXFOR so that aggression, once arising, may 
expand to violent acts against PAXFOR, too.
o Heavily armed combatants are not expected to be in 
the town centre since the local  population is 
considered friendly and would probably note and 
report suspicious non-locals to the local 
administration. However, both groups belonging to 
party B might be slightly armed and carry along bats 
or use other items like bottles, cans or stones to attack 
their antagonists.
Table 1 summarizes the groups' attitudes and different 
intentions.
Group Main setup of group 
members
Primary intention
Members of party A Rather peaceful, but still 
highly aroused and 
showing a high group 
cohesiveness.
Leave the town hall and 
return home
Youngsters of party B Rather high readiness for 
aggression and low 
willingness for 
cooperation




High readiness for 
aggression and anger, 
low fear
Demonstrating against 
members of party A
Bystanders Low anger / readiness for 
aggression, low fear, no 
group cohesiveness
Walk around
Table 1: Groups and their primary intention
9 - IDFW 15 - Team 3
The basecase scenario is shown in Figure 1, an aerial view 
of the terrain using the mission preparation tool VIPER-3D, 
developed at the EADS System Design Centre.
Figure 1: Scenario overview in VIPER-3D
Figure 2 presents a possible equivalent scenario modeled 
with the PAX scenario editor.
 Figure 2: Basecase scenario modeled in PAX
The PAXFOR Operations Analysis cell  is asked to provide 
assistance for the planning of the operation considering the 
following circumstances and question sets:
• What are the benefits of extensive reconnaissance 
measurements prior to the operation? 
• What can be done to prevent bystanders from being 
involved in any conflicts and behaving aggressively 
themselves?
• How can it be assured that peaceful members of party 
A are able to leave the town hall without being 
attacked by aroused counter-demonstrators. 
• How does the announcement of threat of force 
influence the civilians' behavior?
• Under which circumstances can the situation escalate 
to an unacceptable extent?
o Is the relationship of civilians behaving in a 
violent way compared to the manpower of the 
soldiers a sufficient indicator for this?
o What other indicators are of interest?
o Under which circumstances is it recommended to 
stop the operation because extreme escalation can 
not be avoided?
• Does the use of weapons and protective equipment 
add significantly to military success?  Under which 
circumstances?
• Under which circumstances and how is it possible to 
distract or canalize bystanders and other civilian 
groups in order to help deescalate the situation?
The basic scenario was set up in PAX and the team 
members developed vignettes representing different possible 
situations in which the effects of different PAXFOR tactics 
could be analyzed.
ANALYSIS
The main focus of the analysis was to examine how different 
rule sets of the soldiers, e.g. Rules of Engagement (RoEs), 
affect the situation in terms of the following Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs):
• overall escalation of the situation,
• number of casualties on soldiers' side,
• number of casualties on civilians' side,
• number of party A members leaving the town hall 
without being attacked by other civilians,
• number of arrests
• number of civilians attacking with weapons
Having discussed the given scenario, the group was 
mainly interested in considering the influence of the following 
factors:
• Different number of counter-demonstrators
• The counter-demonstrators' attitude towards the party 
A members and towards the military (from rather 
peaceful to highly hostile)
• Different number of soldiers
• Different rulesets for  the soldiers
Determining the important factors
To find out the most important model parameters with 
regard to the given list of MOEs, a number of PAX 
parameters were analyzed in a simulation experiment using 
the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design 
provided by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey, 
CA, USA.
The NOLH design used contained 27 parameters, listed 
below. Each design point was calculated using a MultiRun of 
the simulation model PAX with 20 replications, each with a 
different random seed.
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NOLH Farming Parameters Min Max
Number of counter-demonstrators 50 200
Attitude of party A members towards the military -60 60
Attitude of party B members towards the military -60 60
Attitude of party B youngsters towards party B 
counter-demonstrators -60 60
Party A cognitive motive to leave the town hall 50 100
Party A anger 10 60
Party A readiness for aggression 10 60
Party A personality constant anger 5 80
Party A personality constant fear 5 80
Party B personality constant anger 5 80
Party B personality constant fear 5 80
Party B counter-demonstrators anger 40 80
Party B counter-demonstrators dog factor 1.5 2.0
Party B counter-demonstrators norms for anti-
aggression 5 30
Party B counter-demonstrators readiness for 
aggression 50 90
Party B counter-demonstrators willingness for 
cooperation 10 80
Party B youngsters dog factor 0 2.0
Party B youngsters norms for anti-aggression 5 50
Party B youngsters readiness for aggression 40 90
Party B youngsters entry time 10 80
Bystanders' anger 20 90
Military cordon's threshold for calling reinforcement 0 40
Military escort's duration of action arrest 3 10
Military escort's threshold for intervention 0 200
Military escort's shoving strength 50 100
All soldiers' rule set 1 4
Table 2: Parameters varied in NOLH design study
A soldier's rule set defines his reactions to certain civilian 
actions under specific side conditions. The "PSO Manual" rule 
set represents a moderate reaction to civilian actions trying to 
create a balance between an immediate sharp reaction and a 
complete laissez-faire attitude. 
If the soldiers behave according to the "Gandhi" rule set, 
they always try to pacify the civilians. 
Rule set "Arrest on attacks" specifies that soldiers are 
supposed to arrest the civilian attackers (no matter  whether 
any weapons are used).
Rule set 4 ("Singapore - IDFW15") was developed within 
the working group. Its motivation is to allow some freedom of 
protest up to a point of high group escalation, after which the 
soldiers will react by 
• firing a warning shot in case they are threatened by 
the civilians and 
• arresting the civilians throwing stones in case they are 
attacked by the civilians. 
Figure 3  shows the rules of the various rule sets for the 
soldiers' behavior.
When analyzing the data with the help of commercial off 
the shelf (COTS) statistical software, the following parameters 
turned out to be significantly important for the MOEs 
described above:
• party B counter-demonstrators' attitude towards the 
military
• party B counter-demonstrators' readiness for 
aggression
• party B counter-demonstrators' and party B 
youngsters' dog factor1
• party B youngsters' entry time
• soldiers' rule set
Figure 3: Rule sets examined
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1 The civilian's dog factor influences the evaluation of the soldiers' actions 'Threaten' or 'Defend'. A high value results in a 
higher increase of fear.
Full factorial experiment
Based on the results of the NOLH design experiment and in 
order to assess the effect of the different rules of engagement, 
it was decided to set up a  full factorial design experiment 
varying the party B counter-demonstrators' readiness for 
aggression and their dog factor together with the soldiers' 
rule set. 
Full Factorial Farming Parameters Min Max StepSize
Party B counter-demonstrators readiness for 
aggression 30 90 10
Party B counter-demonstrators dog factor 0.1 1.5 0.2
All soldiers' rule set 1 4 1
Table 3: Parameters varied in full factorial design study
All in all the full factorial study consisted of 4480 single 
PAX runs performed on a 128 node cluster of the Simulation 
and Test Environment of the German Bundeswehr in 
Euskirchen / Germany.
Comparison of the rule sets
Prior to analyzing the result landscapes of the full  factorial 
experiment, the team members wrote down their 
expectations for each ruleset regarding 
• the escalation accumulated during the simulation by 
aggressive actions (i.e. "attacks" and "threats") 
performed by civilians
• the escalation accumulated during the simulation by 
soldiers' use of force (including threatening and 
defending actions),
• the number of attacking actions performed by 
counter-demonstrators involving weapons and 
• the number of defending actions with a shooting 
weapon performed by soldiers.
Figure 4: The team members' expectations 
regarding various MOEs
Regarding the PSO Manual rule set, the team members' 
expectations were mostly met. The "IDFW15 – Team 3" rule 
set, however, performed much better than expected.
Figure 5: Performance of the different rule sets with regard 
to the aggregated escalation that resulted from actions 
performed by civilians
The simulation showed that arresting aggressive civilians 
in a fairly early stage of escalation seems to be a very effective 
means to keep control of the situation.
The evaluation of the result landscape for the MOE 
"Number of Party A members killed" shows that especially the 
rule sets "PSO Manual" and "Gandhi" do not perform well in 
protecting the party A members. (see figure 6)
Figure 6: Performance of the different rule sets 
with regard to the number of party A members killed
However, if the soldiers behaved according to rule set 
"Gandhi", trying to avoid any violent actions and pacifying 
the civilians whenever possible, the overall number of 
civilians killed was heavily reduced. (see figure 7).
The big surprise in comparing the performance of the 
rule sets was that even if the soldiers acted in a  significantly 
tougher way versus party B members ("PSO Manual"), 
resulting in injured and killed party B people, they did not 
perform better in protecting party A members than by using 
the pacifying "Gandhi" rule set.
Thus it appears that in this scenario, if the soldiers do not 
have any means of arresting aggressive civilians, deescalating 
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the situation by pacifying the civilian population seems to be 
the best way to minimize civilian casualties.
Figure 7: Performance of the different rule sets 
with regard to the overall number of civilians killed
CONCLUSIONS
PAX was successfully applied using the Data  Farming 
methodology and tool box to analyze and discuss the 
soldiers' options for actions within the given crowd control 
scenario and to examine how their behavior influences the 
civilian population. Prior to setting up the scenario in PAX, 
the overall scenario situation was examined using the virtual 
reality tool for mission preparation "VIPER-3D".2
The Data Farming process including:
• the identification of the most important factors with 
regard to the relevant MoEs using the NOLH design 
of experiments;
• full factorial experiment designs for finding out more 
especially about the effectiveness of the specific rule 
sets; and
• course of action analysis on representative single runs 
to learn more details about the effects responsible for 
average, good or bad performance of the forces
proved to be very effective regarding the applicability 
and maturity of the method and tools and regarding the 
quality of the results.
The international collaboration in the team and especially 
the expert knowledge of the foreign team members was very 
helpful to get new perspectives and incentives for further 
developments of PAX, usage of experimentation techniques, 
data analysis tools and areas of application.
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2 VIPER-3D had already been applied during the preparation phase in Germany, not at the workshop in Singapore.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurgents have effectively employed asymmetric tactics, 
such as the use of suicide bombers, as viable threats in urban 
environments.    These threats are often devastating in their 
physical and emotional effects. They are hard to detect and 
have proven difficult to thwart or defeat.  The U.S. Army has 
recognized that improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a 
persistent and devastating threat, impacting unit operations, 
U.S. policy and public perception (U.S. Army, 2005).
Suicide Vehicle-Born IEDs (SVBIEDs) would be easier to 
thwart or defeat if the political, cultural, and physical 
environments in which they were implemented were more 
readily constrainable as in full combat operations.  However, 
in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations, it is important to allow the nearly free flow of 
people (noncombatants) and goods through an economically 
developing or thriving community.    The involved urban 
environments can be physically complex and culturally 
diverse. Threats that employ SVBIEDs take this into account 
and use this to their  advantage.  Our current, limited 
understanding of the human behaviors that drive the 
insurgent’s decisioning and responses, and the insurgent’s 
ability to capitalize on the nature of the urban environment in 
stability and support operations adds to the complexity and 
challenges of detecting and defeating this threat.   There is a 
need to increase our understanding of the behavioral  aspects, 
or responses to perceptions regarding the environment, of 
such threats so we can evoke responses that decrease their 
probabilities of mission success and increase our advantage in 
this contemporary operational environment. 
The Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) 
along with the United States Military Academy (USMA) 
Operations Research Center of Excellence (ORCEN) recently 
conducted a study to provide insights into insurgent 
behaviors, or decisioning, and mission outcomes given 
different strategies associated with traffic flow and traffic 
control points (TCPs) applied by counterinsurgent forces.  
The goal of the IDFW 15 effort was to determine the value of 
adding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the 
aforementioned environment.    Specifically, we looked to 
derive insights about semi-autonomous UAS with swarm 
behaviors.  
This extension can assist counterinsurgent forces in 
several ways.    It will drive needs for UAS allocation and 
development by identifying critical elements of semi-
autonomous swarming behavior.    In addition, it may 
highlight mission behavior that shows the most promise by 
expanding the tasks and environment beyond this current 
set.   Due to the complex nature of the problem, the current 
state of understanding in the field, and the exploratory nature 
of the research, insights vice specific answers are central in 
this research.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study addresses whether we can isolate factors needed 
to identify effective semiautonomous UAS behaviors that 
add value to the aforementioned SVBIED TCP study.   Ideal 
UAS implementation would maximize the area searched and 
minimize time between UAS passes within a defined 
geographic zone in order to locate and track SVBIEDs.  
In the study scenarios, insurgents selected a fixed target, 
planned a route based on awareness of friendly TCPs, and 
moved through an urban environment to attack the target 
using one SVBIED.  While executing the mission, the SVBIED 
could be detected by roving UAS or encounter TCPs of which 
they were not previously aware.    If the SVBIED was 
identified by a UAS, selected TCPs within the local 
neighborhood would change from a static to a mobile 
posture.   The mobile TCPs would receive updated SVBIED 
locations from the UAS in contact.  They would then close 
with and interdict the SVBIED.   
Within this context, we investigated the following study 
questions:  
• Is SVBIED mission outcome a function of varied UAS 
swarming behaviors where mission outcome is 
SVBIED reaches primary target and detonates, 
detonates at an alternate target, or fails to detonate at 
any target?
• Does swarming behavior enhance UAS performance 
when searching an area for a specific target?
• In cases where the SVBIED reaches its primary target, 
what factors are important?
• In cases where the SVBIED detonates at alternate 
location, what factors are important?
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METHOD
Team 4 used the Map Aware Non-uniform Automata 
(MANA) agent based simulation as it was also the 
simulation used for prior  experiments with this study. 
MANA provided the flexibility we needed in agent 
personality, communications architecture, and agent 
behavior to effectively model employment of UAS in a 
variety of ways. 
This research incorporated principles from several fields 
to explore factors associated with effectiveness of strategies in 
asymmetric environments.    Agent based modeling, large-
scale experimental design, and artificial electro-magnetic field 
theory were used to develop methods for capturing complex 
adaptive system behavior associated with nonlinear 
interactions.   The artificial electro-magnetic field theory was 
used for global insurgent path planning and UAS separation. 
An agent based modeling environment was selected for 
implementing and executing the scenarios.    The large-scale 
experimental design was used to establish factor settings 
(e.g., UAS speed, Swarm Behavior) for the scenarios.  
Previous studies focused on exploring the impact of 
friendly and adversary capabilities and TCP strategies on 
SVBIED mission outcomes.  These experiments ranged from a 
single target with a static defense array and sparse road 
network to multiple targets with a dynamic defense array 
within a dense road network.    Capabilities examined 
included friendly and adversary communications and sensor 
performance during mission execution.    The strong 
association of TCP strategy with SVBIED mission outcome 
spurred this extension of the investigation and led to the 
current set of experiments. 
The visual representation of the current study appears 
similar to the previous experiments.    Visually, it looks as 
though we’ve only added 3 UAS.  However, there is a 
different command and control structures for the 
counterinsurgent forces.  In addition, previously static TCPs 
can move to an SVBIED when it is identified.  
The area of interest is a 5km x 5km box representing an 
urban area with a dense road network.  The network consists 
of primary and secondary roads.  There is an array of TCPs 
meant to interdict SVBIED attacks, background traffic, and a 
target.   In addition, there are a number of spotters to provide 
information to the SVBIED and its escorts as it travels toward 
the target.  
Our baseline simulation used UAS in the simulation 
with prescriptive programmed behavior to represent the 
present state of the art.   In addition, they reported data to one 
central ground station.  We assumed transmitted data would 
be in the form of video transmission and associated metadata 
such as time and geographic locations of both the UAS and 
its observations.    We also assumed there was no direct 
communication between any of the 3 UAS.
We developed factors on interest based on insights 
gleened from previous simulation attempts at swarming 
UAS.   We employed a consistent TCP allocation to negate the 
influence of that factor.    Within MANA, factors considered 
were the following: UAS Detection Range, UAS Classification 
Probability, UAS and TCP Communications Delay, UAS to 
UAS Repel tendency, UAS Inorganic Situational Awareness 
(ISA) Persistence, and UAS Speed.   
Figure 1: Urban Environment with Dense Road Network
The factors UAS Detection Range and Speed are self-
explanatory.    Ideally we wanted to maximize both, but we 
realized significant increases in speed can result in a 
degradation of the UAS observation capability.   In addition, 
we didn’t want to model unrealistic detection capabilities. 
Instead, we modeled a  modest ability for the UAS to detect 
and classify a target as an SVBIED.  Because this study may 
be used to drive future capability development, we thought 
this feature was important to explore.   
UAS detection capability was modeled because we 
assumed that some intelligence about pending SVBIED 
missions existed.  That intelligence, however strong, would be 
fed to the UAS and their  operators.  It would provide some 
guidance as to when or where to begin a search as well as 
what the SVBIED may look like.  We think this is plausible.  
Even in areas where coalition forces are unable to affect 
the SVBIED decision cycle, forensic and historical data exists. 
This data could be used as a substitute for real time or 
actionable intelligence.  A semi-autonomous UAS would use 
the information and an estimation of its veracity to drive its 
search pattern.  A UAS ground station operator would 
essentially do the same thing with his reconnaissance plan.  
The factors we manipulated to explore swarming with 
the MANA software were UAS Repel, and UAS ISA 
Persistence.  These two factors seem to be keys in simulating 
swarming behavior.  The essence of swarming behavior is an 
entity’s situational awareness (SA) as a function of the 
group’s situational awareness given current or recent input of 
other local entities as they collaborate on tasks.  Updates to 
the global and individual SA elicit changes in behavior for 
each entity.  
This self-organized behavior optimizes the group’s 
effort.  For instance, ants, when searching for food, move 
along trails and leave a  scent, a pheromone, to mark their 
presence.  If other ants in the area come upon the trail and 
detect high levels of pheromone, they too begin to follow the 
trail.  Low levels will cause them to ignore the trail.  This is 
because high levels of pheromone indicate high traffic flow. 
The ants are programmed to assume that high traffic flow 
means success location of a  close by food source.  This 
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strategy ensures that the colony exhausts any nearby food 
before other more arduous exploration begins.  
In the simulation, the assigned collaborative task is 
identification of SVBIEDs within an urban setting.  Here, 
swarming behavior ensures that the UAS are continually 
conducting surveillance throughout.  As a strategy, UAS 
should remain dispersed so as not to overlap.  Still, they need 
to revisit each other’s paths after time has passed for vigilant 
observation.  Varying the UAS’ repellence between each other 
allowed us to set how far apart they would remain from each 
another.  
If the inter-search time between observations is too long 
there may be gaps in the reconnaissance that would permit an 
SVBIED undetected travel to a TCP or   its intended target. 
We addressed this with the ISA persistence.  It varied the 
strength of the memory or the pheromone left when a UAS 
last passed over a location.  Opposite from the ant example, 
UAS would be compelled to return to areas where the 
pheromone is weak.  
Swarm behavior can be an optimization tool that 
balances simple jobs to meet the larger task of finding 
SVBIEDs.  Varied levels of the factors as well as assigned UAS 
routes allowed for representation of 3 different types of 
swarming behavior as well as two variations of a baseline (no 
swarm) behavior, No Swarm A, No Swarm B, Daisy Chain, 
Central Hub, and All Net. 
UAS in the No Swarm variants did not interact.  They 
shared no information nor did they sense or repel each other. 
Daisy Chain, Central Hub, and All Net represented swarming 
of semi-autonomous UAS. Thus, the 3 UAS in each scenario 
used information from the others to self-organize within the 
reconnaissance zone and search for SVBIEDs.  
UAS in No Swarm mode strictly followed 
preprogrammed search patterns to search the urban area. 
Swarming UAS were given general guidance by assigning 
paths but instructions also included generous levels of 
stochastic behavior.  This allowed the UAS to stray from paths 
based on information from its UAS swarm-mates.  Differences 
in the organization of the UAS defined their designation 
Daisy Chain, Central Hub, or All Net.  Factor levels were 
varied for all UAS strategies in order to measure their 
influence on mission outcome as well.
TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3 UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
TCPs TCPs
UAV 1 UAV 2 UAV 3
Central Hub Daisy Chain
All Net No Swarm
Figure 2: UAS Organization Methods
Though similar, these arrangements represent significant 
differences in infrastructure or robust reliability of data 
exchange.  Given limitations of UAS processing or line of 
sight communications, they lend themselves to specific 
application.  For instance, All Net is the most reliable system 
but it demands UAS that can provide near real time 
identification of specific targets for transmission to its friendly 
command and control neighborhood.  It also requires constant 
communications over the local neighborhood.  There are no 
UAS that are currently up to the task as a semi-autonomous 
system.  In addition, the data bandwidth requirement is 
infeasible as it grows exponentially with each additional UAS 
or receiver.  
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To address the study questions, seven factors as shown in 
table 1 were incorporated into a nearly-orthogonal Latin 
hypercubes (NOLH) experimental design.    A full factorial 
design would have yielded thousands of design points.  
Using NOLH, we reduced the number of design points to 17 
and executed 25 replications per design point for a total of 
425 runs. Each replication was a realization of a stochastic 
process of UAS behavior, route selection and traffic flow as 
modeled in MANA.  This was done for each of the 5  UAS 
strategies. 
Due to excessive run times for each simulation (over 96 
hours), we have yet to analyze all of the output data.  Our 
hope is that some, if not all, of the factors are significant and 
that the different UAS strategies yield statistically different 
outcomes in reference to the rate an SVBIED will detonate at 
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Table 1: Factors Employed in Scenarios
INITIAL FINDINGS
Though we cannot offer any analytical bounty from this 
effort, there are a number of insights thus far.  The first 
speaks to the length of time our simulation requires for 1 
run.  Each simulation can take up to 26000 steps (over 7 
hours in real time).  With over 2000 iterations to run, this is a 
labor intensive effort.  
The runs are long for two reasons.  The background 
urban traffic flow reaches steady state at about 8000 steps.  For 
the model to be valid, this warm up period is a necessity.  The 
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traffic congestion is indispensable in order to determine the 
strengths and weakness of strategies in an urban region. 
Realistic traffic throughput defines the current environment 
for all players.  
In addition to reaching steady state, the stochastic nature 
of the SVBIED movement and probability of UAS or TCP 
success make end time estimations difficult to gauge.  The 
long runtime is a  reflection of our desire to capture as many 
final outcomes as possible.  We will analyze the data 
associated with SVBIED interdiction or detonation to fine tune 
the simulation run times.  
There were a couple challenges in the model as well.  It 
was difficult to mimic the UAS ability to detect and classify a 
target as an SVBEID.  We didn’t want the camouflage of the 
SVBIED so low that the UAS were not valued added but we 
didn’t want the UASs to be omnipotent either.  
We compromised by linking the SVBIED escorts to the 
UAS.  The escorts knew where the SVBIED was at all times. 
We arranged for at least one of the UAS to have contact with 
an escort and receive updates.  To level the playing field 
some, we varied reliability of the escorts’ ISA as it was 
transmitted to the UAS.  Then the UAS more or less knew the 
VBIED location and description.  We felt this method 
mimicked the sparse intelligence units currently have about 
SVBIED operations.  
Another challenge was modeling swarming in MANA. 
We were able to mimic pheromones and their fleeting nature 
by using the Persistence value parameter.  However, we were 
unable to verify that we could fine tune a  UAS’ receptors to 
react to pheromones.  We had very little information about 
the ranges at which the pheromones were helping drive UAS 
behaviors.    
THE WAY AHEAD
After collecting the forthcoming data, we hope to further 
explore important factors by recreating this experiment in 
different environments using different goals and tasks for 
the UAS.  This would help us determine which UAS 
strategies are most effective in each environment.  For 
example, in a civil  search and rescue scenario, the Daisy 
Chain may be sufficient.  However in a hostile situation, the 
redundancy of other methods may prove necessary.  Tasks to 
be explored include various types of reconnaissance, direct 
fire engagements, search and rescue, and forward 
observation.  Settings of interest include both conventional 
and unconventional conflict, natural disaster, and border 
patrols.   
The intricacy and dire outcomes of the SVBIED problem 
demand high fidelity models to gain traction and begin 
validation of new counterinsurgent strategies.  We are 
investigating the construction of a federation of simulation 
models to study this problem.  Though no small effort on its 
own, we will try to mimic the success of federated training 
models.  We will leverage models that best represent the sub-
elements of this complex adaptive system.  We hope to build a 
user friendly model that varies parameters within a 
constructive simulation and farming output data by 
leveraging the best tools available. 
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Team 4
 International Data Farming Workshop 15
 Plenary Sessions
Cultivating an Exchange of Knowledge  
Following is a list of the keynote and plenary sessions at IDFW 15.  These presentations, as well as team in- and out-briefs, 
team reports, models and data can be found on the IDFW15 CD or website (see inside back cover for details).
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Poster Session
Keynote
Dr. How Khee Yin, 
Director, Info Division, DSO 
National Laboratories
Opening Session
 International Data Farming Workshop 15
 Plenary Sessions
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Topic Sessions
Wednesday Sessions
• Jonathan Alt - Representing Urban Cultural 
Geography in Stability Operations
• Choo Chwee Seng - Modeling the Effects 
of Human Intangibles
• Philip Hingston - Evolution and Intelligence
• Gunther Schwarz - Agent-based Modeling 
and Simulation MPECS Architecture
• Ted Meyer - Exploring Data
• Luminita Stemate  - A Multi-Paradigm 
Approach to Crowd Control Modelling & 
Simulation 
Tuesday Sessions
• Choo Chwee Seng - Modelling, Simulation 
& Analysis in ORL
• Gunther Schwarz - EADS PAX Toolbox
• Gary Horne - Data Farming for Beginners
• Susan Sanchez - Using Simulation to Study 
the Protection of Critical Maritime Assets
Thursday Sessions
• Dietmar Kunde - The ITSimBw Simulation 
Environment
• Lawton Clites - Medical Modeling Update
• Bradely Wilson - Modeling 
Communications and HITL in MANA
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Abstract
Fractional Factorial Controlled Sequential Bifurcation 
(FFCSB) is a newly proposed two-phase screening procedure 
for large-scale simulation experiments. Sequential screening 
algorithms inform the decision maker of critical factors in 
their simulation models and optimize the use of 
computation resources in studying only critical factors. 
At IDFW15, FFCSB is applied to the Hierarchy 
organizational model, which serves as a  benchmark to 
compare innovative Command and Control (C2) structures 
for enabling more effective warfare. The model is developed 
in Projects, Organizations and Work for Edge Research, which 
crystallizes two decades of collaborative research between the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Stanford University.
Motivation
Everyday, organizations use software simulations to make 
better decisions. Software simulations of real world systems 
are often large and rich with many parameters potentially 
affecting final outcomes. Faced with a multitude of 
parameters, decision makers may not know or may lose 
sight of the few truly critical factors. Thus, screening 
algorithms are essential in order to identify the factors that 
most impact outcome measures. This enables experimenters 
to better  utilize their resources by focusing on truly 
important factors.
Fractional Factorial Controlled 
Sequential Bifurcation (FFCSB)
FFCSB is a newly proposed two-phase screening procedure 
for large-scale simulation experiments (Sanchez, Wan and 
Lucas, 2005.)  FFCSB comprises two stages: (1) a fractional 
factorial (FF) pre-screening phase to sort factors by the 
direction of their effects (whether an increase in factor leads 
to a positive or negative change in the measure of 
performance) and (2) a controlled sequential bifurcation 
(CSB) to conduct sequential experimentation with accuracy 
guarantees. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Flow of FFCSB
FFCSB offers several enhancements over conventional 
screening algorithms. First, FFCSB dramatically reduces the 
need for a priori knowledge on the direction of factor effects, 
which is often a condition for optimal performance of 
conventional algorithms and has proven difficult to meet. 
FFCSB also does not require a priori  knowledge of the number 
of experiments required for factor classification. It conducts 
sufficient experiments to complete classification. Second, 
FFCSB scales well for large scale models with thousands of 
factors. Third, FFCSB provides accuracy guarantees in its 
factor classification. Fourth, FFCSB provides a savings in 
computation.
Hierarchy Organizational Model 
in POW-ER
At IDFW15, FFCSB is applied to the Hierarchy 
organizational model developed by the Center for Edge 
Power (CEP) at NPS and Stanford University. CEP studies 
innovative C2 structures to enable more powerful warfare. 
The Hierarchy model is developed in POW-ER—Projects, 
Organizations and Work for Edge Research—a virtual 
environment for computational modeling of C2 
organizations and processes. This computation tool 
crystallizes two decades of collaborative research between 
NPS and Stanford University. The tool is based upon sound 
research in organizational studies and has been validated 
extensively and thoroughly (Orr and Nissen 2006, p. 8; Levitt 
et al, 2005.)
The POW-ER environment uses agent-based simulation 
to emulate micro-behaviors (e.g. trust, learning, skill  sets 
compatibility, skill competency, centralization) and discrete-
event-simulation to emulate processes (e.g., meetings, 
exception occurrences, rework, process quality). 
Organizational performance is measured by quantitative 
metrics, such as project duration, project risk, project cost.
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Figure 2: Hierarchy Organization Model in POW-ER
The Hierarchy model is modeled by three sets of 
structural factors: (1) organization structure (2) 
communication structure (3) work structure (Nissen 2005 p. 
11.) The model is simulated in two contrasting mission 
contexts: Industrial Age and 21st Century. The mission 
contexts are modeled by three manipulations of mission 
factors: (1) mission and environmental context, (2) network 
architecture and (3) professional competency (Nissen 2005, p. 
14.) 
In computational experiments on the Hierarchy and other 
organizational models, the researchers typically varied one 
factor group (i.e., multiple factors) at a time, and record 
multiple Measures of Performances (MOPs) associated with 
each factor  group change. The various organization models 
are then compared using these results and changes in 
performance are justified by the experimental manipulations.
FFCSB extends CEP’s suite of tools for computational 
experimentation. Through smart and efficient designs of 
experiments, FFCSB identifies single critical factors that most 
impact the single MOP of Project Duration.
Methodology of Applying FFCSB on 
Hierarchy Model
Subject matter experts selected Project Duration as the MOP 
of interest for FFCSB application. They also identified 114 
factors of interest, with associated 2-level factor ranges for 
exploration. 
Working within the computation and time constraints of 
IDFW15, the team refined the factor ranges to smaller ranges 
of interests and divided the entire factor space into three 
smaller subspaces. The factor space is shown in the Table 1. 
These factors categories are intended to mirror those used in 
prior experimentation (Gateau et al., 2007, pp. 7-8) but may 
not be exact.
Mission & Environment
Function Exception Probability 
Project Exception Probability 
Task Effort Required 
Task Learning Days 
Task Priority 
Task Requirement Complexity 
Task Solution Complexity 
Task Uncertainty 
Full Time Equivalent (Manpower available)
Network Architecture
Mission Priority 
Length Of Work-day 

















Table 1: Factor Spaces of Exploration for the Hierarchy Model
Results of FFCSB Exploration
The following tables (2-3) summarize the FFCSB findings of 
important factors in the Hierarchy model that most impact 
Project Duration. There were no factors classified as 




Mission Project Exception 
Probability 
+
Surface Msn Effort +
Surface Msn Solution Complexity +
Ground Msn Effort +
Ground Msn Requirement Complexity +
Ground Msn Solution Complexity +
Table 2: Important Factors in 




Mission Team Experience +
Air A Air Skill Ratings -
Ground Ground Skill Ratings -
Table 3: Important Factors in 
Professional Competency Factor Subspace
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In the first factor subspace of Mission & Environment, 
SMEs identified the factors of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) and 
Effort as important. FTE measures the equivalent of 
manpower resources available and Task Effort quantifies the 
time effort requirement of the task. Contrary to expert 
opinion, FFCSB did not classify any FTE factors as important 
over the factor range of exploration. Therein lies our first 
surprise: FTE is not as important as the other factors in this 
subspace in impacting the Project Duration. In line with 
expert opinion, FFCSB classified Effort factors as important, 
but only for Surface Missions and Ground Missions out of all 
eight missions in the Hierarchy model. Critical path analysis 
of the Hierarchy model explains why factors associated with 
only these two missions showed up consistently as important.
Figure 3: Critical Path Analysis of Hierarchy model shows Air 
Missions 1, Surface, and Ground Missions on Critical Path
The red bars in Figure 3 depict the critical path of the 
project simulated in the Hierarchy model. Following the red 
bars, the Air Missions 1, Surface Missions and Ground 
Missions are on the critical path. Of these three missions, the 
Surface Missions and Ground Missions have minimum float, 
i.e., there is no allowance for shifting these missions in time. 
Hence, these two missions are crucial to the MOP of Project 
Duration. Besides the Task Effort factor, FFCSB also classified 
the Solution Complexity factors of the Surface and Ground 
Missions as important, as well as the Requirements 
Complexity of the Ground Missions. This is our second 
surprise: FFCSB has further quantified expert opinion by 
flagging those factors associated with missions on the critical 
path only and with specific characteristics.
In addition, FFCSB classified the global factor of Project 
Exception Probability (PEP) as important. PEP is the 
probability that a subtask will fail and generate rework for 
failure dependent tasks. This factor is significant for the 
Hierarchy model that is characterized by sequential and 
interdependent tasks and hence, suffers a longer Project 
Duration in the event of increased PEP.
Our third surprise is: In the second factor subspace of 
Network Architecture, there are no factors classified as 
important for the particular factor ranges explored. This 
finding is in agreement with SMEs, who did not expect any 
important factors in this subspace. A set of (relatively 
computationally expensive) Resolution V Fractional Factorials 
design was used to verify the factor coefficients in this factor 
group. The results confirmed that the factor coefficients were 
relatively small in magnitude and hence, practically 
insignificant. 
In the third factor subspace of Professional Competency, 
experts identified Skill  Ratings and Application Experience 
factors as important. FFCSB classified the Skill Ratings of the 
Air A and Ground personnel as important, but not that of the 
Surface personnel. These three groups of personnel are 
responsible for the missions on the critical path. The contrast 
between the three missions is that the Surface mission requires 
considerably more effort of 21 months versus that of the Air 
Missions 1  (11 months) and Ground Missions (6.5 months). 
These findings suggest that Skill Ratings may be more critical 
for missions that lie on the critical path and have relatively 
shorter Effort requirements. FFCSB did not classify 
Application Experience as important. 
Interestingly, FFCSB classified Team Experience as 
important and positively related to the MOP. Team 
Experience quantifies the degree of familiarity that team 
members have in working with one another as a  team. In 
other words, this finding suggests that more team experience 
leads to longer Project Duration in the Hierarchy model. This 
is our fourth surprise. This counter-intuitive finding may 
have been observed in earlier research and experimentation. 
Ramsey and Levitt (2005) summarized high level findings 
from Horii, Jin and Levitt’s “Modeling and Analyzing 
Cultural Influences on Team Performance through Virtual 
Experiments” (2004) on the impact of cultural differences in 
project teams: “Japanese-style organizations were more 
effective, with either US or Japanese agents, at performing 
tasks with high interdependence when the team experience of 
members was low.” The Hierarchy model studied in this 
application shares common characteristics of centralized 
authority, high formalization, and multiple hierarchies with 
the Japanese-style organization modeled in Horii, Jin and 
Levitt (2004, pp. 3). In addition, these experiments had used 
the MOPs of Project Duration and Quality Risk to quantify 
team performance, while this FFCSB application only used 
Project Duration. Hence, there is common ground to compare 
the similarity of both findings. Had the original intuition on 
Team Experience been applied with conventional screening 
algorithms, this factor could have distorted screening 
findings. 
Lastly, there were two interesting observations. The 
Hierarchy model has a  3-tier command chain that models the 
Command, Coordination and Operations layers in a Joint Task 
Force. There were more important factors associated with the 
Operations layer than the other layers. Second, there were 
more uncontrollable or difficult to control factors (e.g., Project 
Exception Probability, Task Requirement Complexity, Task 
Solution Complexity and Team Experience) than controllable 
or easy to control factors (e.g., Skill Ratings.)
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Way Ahead
There are limitations to the FFCSB application to any model. 
FFCSB assumes a main effects model, and interactions can 
distort the accuracy of factor classification. The nature of the 
response variance (homogeneous or heterogeneous) and its 
magnitude are unknown. Both model characteristics could 
have bearings on the FFCSB findings and accuracy 
guarantees. Particular to the Hierarchy model, the 
observations of this FFCSB exploration are unique to the 
factor space organization and ranges of exploration. Hence, 
the findings are not conclusive of the Hierarchy model. The 
important factor classification and observations are meant to 
provide direction for researchers in future work and 
optimize their experimentation budget on truly important 
factors. 
The team is greatly encouraged by the findings of the 
first-case application of FFCSB on a real world simulation 
model. There were interesting findings and many delightful 
surprises. Initially, some findings appeared counter-intuitive 
to the data-farmers but were later justified through critical 
path analysis and through comparison with earlier research 
on similar models. Hence, it is an encouraging sign that 
FFCSB can serve as a complementary tool to better 
understand complex simulation models.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of design of experiment (DOE) and data farming 
techniques is critical to effectively planning, and 
subsequently evaluating, tests of complex adaptive systems 
in a joint mission environment.  The Joint Test and 
Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) program, in conjunction 
with the SEED Center  at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), and TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey, is 
developing methods and processes that incorporate these 
techniques into the development of the "test and evaluation 
strategy" phase of the Capability Test Methodology (CTM). 
In order to structure the underlying business rules and 
concepts in the CTM's evaluation thread, a  Capability 
Evaluation Metamodel (CEM) is being developed.
The CEM measures framework consists of mission 
measures of effectiveness (MOE), task measures of 
performance (MOP), and system/system of systems (SoS) 
attributes.  The mission MOEs assess the contribution of the 
system under test (SUT) and SoS capabilities to achieving the 
mission desired effects. Task MOPs address essential task 
performance related to the identified test issues (critical joint 
issues [CJI], critical operational issues [COI]).  System/SoS 
attribute measures are used to evaluate the achievement of 
system or SoS performance across doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF). The evaluation measures for the CTM 
map from mission to task to attribute level is shown figure 1.
Figure 1: CEM Measures Overview
During IDFW 14 working sessions, team participants 
presented and refined a representative use case to define input 
factors and levels of an executable capability test design. 
Dimensions of this test design are mission, SoS, and mission 
conditions (including threat force and environmental 
conditions). This exercise of applying joint mission-level 
capability concepts to the structure of an efficient DOE 
provided a basis for use of executable design of experiment 
analysis as part of developing and refining the CEM. Team 
participants also discussed an integrated set of visualization, 
modeling, analysis, and simulation (VMAS) catalysts required 
to operate on CEM structures.  Potential VMAS catalysts 
include test design visualization, statistical DOEs, simulation 
model classes and hybrids, as well as simulation analysis and 
visualization techniques which can fill capability evaluation 
gaps in the front-end part of the CTM evaluation thread.
APPROACH
During IDFW 15, Team 6’s goal was to demonstrate and 
improve SoS test scoping and design techniques, as they 
pertain to capabilities supporting joint missions.  We used a 
four-part approach to address this data farming goal:
• Characterize past and hypothetical capability design 
use cases, including the refinement of a hypothetical 
CJI and CEM test designs.
• Apply DOE techniques to initial multi-factor CEM 
capability designs.  The DOE focus was on Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) and Fractional 
Factorial Controlled Sequential Bifurcation (FFCSB) 
DOE techniques, which are being enhanced at the 
NPS.
24 - IDFW 15 - Team 6
• Conduct data farming on selected factors of this 
efficient DOE using Tester and Pythagoras agent 
based simulation (ABS) models.
• Conduct initial analysis of ABS results.
The following questions were addressed by Team 6 
activities during IDFW 15:
• Given a  past use case limited by JTEM FY07 event 
constraints (limited SoS composition, partial task 
thread), which factors are the most important to look 
at for testing?
• Using a hypothetical use case (FY07 event constraints 
removed) and a refined CJI, which factors are the most 
important to look at for testing?
During the workshop, Team 6 conducted "test and 
evaluation strategy" activities to design and focus the test 
space for the above stated use cases.  These activities included 
validation of previously developed CEM concepts including 
CJIs with associated measures, levels, and factors for input 
into existing models.  An iterative approach for refinement of 
large capability test spaces was exercised involving: 
developing an efficient capability design of experiment, 
running model designs on a high performance computing 
cluster, performing multivariate analysis using the JMP 
statistical analysis tool, and discussing model design 
refinement to focus on important factors. The results of this 
workshop provided valuable input into the development and 
improvement of the CTM.
For the past use case, Team 6 used version 1.0 of Tester, 
an agent-based model developed in the MASON framework, 
to perform exploratory data farming in support of JTEM’s 
data farming for test planning effort.  This data farming effort 
included exploring the results from a recent SoS test event, 
expanding the bounds of the test results, and understanding 
the functionality of the model at this point.  An NOLH DOE 
was used for the past use case which included the following 
independent variable factors:
• Time to clear airspace
• Aircraft speed
• Air support request (ASR) approval time
• Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) restricted 
fire zone (RFZ) time
• Close air support (CAS) tasking time
• CAS Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) 
coordination time
The dependent response variable in the past use case 
DOE was CAS Elapsed Time, which is an example of a task 
MOP in the CEM measures framework.
The following hypothetical CJI was refined by Team 6 in 
order to create a capability design for the hypothetical use 
case:
Assess Integrated Fires Command and Control (C2) task 
performance (for example, CAS, Fires, Dynamic Targeting) to 
achieve joint forcible entry operations desired effects (for 
example, threat ineffectiveness, Blue survivability) by an 
Integrated Fires SoS compositions (for example, C2 system 
focus, force application system enablers).
CJIs are used to assess performance pertaining to 
capabilities which support joint missions.  A CJI for  test and 
evaluation should be carefully structured to address key 
capability gaps described in joint capability documentation. 
The essential elements of a CJI include a capability’s essential 
tasks, mission desired effects, Blue SoS (across DOTMLPF), 
and conditions involving threat and environmental factors. 
CJIs should address the SoS capability to perform joint 
operational tasks and/or the SoS, system, or Service attribute 
performance.
Based on the hypothetical CJI, a set of capability test 
design independent variable factors were created based on the 
factor dimensions of the CEM Joint Operational Context for 
Test (JOC-T).  The JOC-T describes the overall philosophy of 
forces operating jointly and the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) to be employed to achieve effects on the 
battlefield by exhibiting capabilities they will not possess 
separately.  The JOC-T should specify mission objectives (for 
example, mission statement, mission desired effects, mission 
end state), Blue forces (for example, system capability 
requirements, system means to implement those 
requirements, system operating limitations, SoS context, task 
organization, C2 structure, force lay down with logical 
groupings of primary nodes), Blue actions, environment 
conditions (for example, physical conditions, civil conditions, 
neutral forces), threat forces (for example, threat order of 
battle,  C2 structure, systems, threat lay down), threat actions, 
and interactions (for example, Blue to threat, Blue to Blue, 
threat to threat, Blue to environment, threat to environment).
Using these JOC-T dimensions, an initial hypothetical 
capability test design was developed containing 37 
continuous factors and 25 categorical factors for a total 
number of 62 possible independent variables.  To perform 
preliminary data farming in support of hypothetical use case, 
the Pythagoras ABS model was used on a selected subset of 
the 62 possible factors that could be modeled in the current 
Pythagoras functionality.  The DOE used for the hypothetical 
use case was an NOLH which included the following 
independent variable factors:
• Organic SA persistence
• Inorganic SA persistence
• Organic fuse radius
• Organic fuse time
• Inorganic fuse radius
• Inorganic fuse time
• Communication delay
• Sensor offset X
• Sensor offset Y
The dependent response variable in the hypothetical use 
case DOE was Blue survivability, which is an example of a 
mission MOE in the CEM measures framework.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The past use case using version 1.0 of Tester produced 
modeling results as shown in the classification and 
regression tree (CART) analysis shown in figure 2. The most 
significant factor was the CAOC RFZ time, followed by CAS 
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tasking time and ASR approval time. These three factors 
accounted for a 46% degradation of the CAS Elapsed Time 
Task MOP.  This was a  surprise to the majority of team 
members who had predicted force application factors, such 
as Time to clear airspace and Aircraft speed would be most 
significant.  Instead, for this modeling implementation, C2 
factors centered at the CAOC were dominant.
Figure 2: Past Use Case Tester 1.0 Model Results
To set the stage for the hypothetical DOE analysis, Dr. 
Sanchez described the strengths and weaknesses of various 
potential DOE techniques for large factor capability test 
designs using the following comparative analysis.  Many 
designs are possible for the hypothetical case which could 
create between 64 and 663,552 design pts.  Response 3 or 
Response 5 Fractional Factorial, FFCSB, a variety of NOLHs, 
and crossed/hybrid DOEs are potential design techniques. 
The choice depends on analysis considerations including:
• Types of insights desired
• Main effects, interactions, detail in looking at MOEs
• Number of factors
• Mix of continuous/discrete/qualitative factors
• Simulation run times
• Computational budget
Figure 3: Hypothetical Use Case Pythagoras Model Results
The hypothetical use case using the Pythagoras ABS 
produced modeling results as shown in the CART analysis, 
shown in figure 3.  The most significant factor was Inorganic 
Situational Awareness Persistence.  Inorganic is defined as 
external to the “organic” unit modeled in Pythagoras. 
Persistence relates to the duration of threat target information 
Inorganic Fusion Time and Organic Fusion Radius. The best 
case design (least Blue causalities in the mission MOE 
response) related to limiting clutter on the Blue situational 
awareness map.  This was also a surprise to many team 
members who had predicted physics-based force application 
factors, such as sensor offsets, would be most important to 
limiting Blue casualties.  Instead, for  this modeling 
implementation, situational awareness and C2 fusion factors 
were dominant.
INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Team 6 insights included the need to further expand DOE 
parameters for capability testing and that the importance of 
non-materiel  C2 factors was underestimated in the team’s 
ABS results.  Another surprise during IDFW 15 was the fact 
that Aloe Vera is more than just lotion; it also comes in 
yogurt form. Takeaways for the CTM included the benefits 
of applying hybrid DOE approaches, successful 
demonstrations of an iterative design – model/scenario 
development –  analysis approach, and the need for 
supporting tools to enable data farming as part of CTM 
capability test design refinement and evaluation.
Recommendations from IDFW 15 Team 6 activities center 
on enhancement of data farming techniques for further 
application to capability based assessment. Specifically, 
enhancements to the Tester and Pythagoras ABS models are 
recommended for higher fidelity, more efficient capability 
explorations.  These enhancements involve both ABS 
functionality, as well the automation of scenario input and 
MOE output analysis.  The refinement of DOE techniques for 
large factor, multiple response designs is also identified. 
Developing functionality for guided selections of appropriate 
DOE techniques is also highlighted by the team as a 
promising way ahead, based on initial results.  Follow-on 
efforts include the incorporation of data farming approaches 
into the CTM version 2.0 and 3.0, potentially including 
efficient design of experiments, the use of computing clusters, 
and the iterative data farming process.  The intent is to explore 
enhanced DOE techniques and models at IDFW 16. Both use 
case explorations, in addition to providing data for analysis, 
helped in the development of the data farming infrastructure 
for the evolving CTM development by JTEM and its partners. 
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INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructures work together to produce goods and 
services. For example, the power station generates electricity 
and the water purification station uses the electricity to 
produce drinking water. Disruption of Civil Infrastructures 
will affect our national security, economic well  being and 
way of life. This provides a primary motivation to model 
and understand the interaction between infrastructures. 
Based on our works in military modeling and simulation 
(M&S), we have extended these M&S methodologies to the 
area of Critical Infrastructure Protection. However, we 
observed that it take a reasonable amount of modeling effort 
to model a large network of infrastructures.
There is a need to provide quick answer to operational 
users. It is sometimes sufficient to have a ballpark estimate of 
the consequence of a possible disruption in the infrastructure 
network. This will also assist them to decide on a smaller 
subset of infrastructures to do detailed modeling and analysis 
later. 
In this workshop, we are proposing to model each 
infrastructure & its interactions by Network Topology. We 
implemented this methodology in the NetLogo software. The 
following sections will  discuss our objective for this 
workshop, describe the scenarios ran during the workshop 
and highlight some lessons learnt.
DURING THE WORKSHOP 
Workshop Objective
In this workshop, we used a case study to evaluate the 
feasibility of this methodology to model the interaction 
between infrastructures. The case study here is a  military 
supply chain network model. The initial military supply 
chain model is developed by Vidal  [1]. For the purpose of 
this workshop, we added some modifications to this model. 
The objective is to design a military supply chain with 
better survivability. The model consists of three types of 
battalions namely, Main Supply Battalion (MSB), Forward 
Supply Battalion (FSB) and combat battalion.  A MSB supplies 
goods to a group of FSBs and each FSB in turn feeds the goods 
to a  number of combat battalions. We are interested to 
determine how different configurations of MSBs, FSBs and 
battalion will affect the network survivability.
Network survivability
Survivability is defined as Robustness, Responsiveness and 
Flexibility. Robustness looks at how the size of the network 
changes when some nodes are removed. Responsiveness 
measures how quickly some commodities can flow through 
a network when some nodes are attacked and fail. Flexibility 
focuses on whether alternate paths exist in a network so that 
commodity can continue to flow to others nodes after some 
node failures. To measure these parameters, we have to 
compute the characteristic path length and the largest 
component of the network. The characteristics path length 
calculates the average number of links required to connect 
each node to every other nodes in the network while the 
largest component of the network determines the maximum 
number of nodes that continue to link to each other after 
some nodes are removed.
To look at how network structures will affect the network 
survivability, we considered three structures, namely Random 
network, Scale-free network and UltraLog network. 
Researchers have already studied the behavior of Random 
and Scale-free networks under different attack modes. In 
general, there are two attack modes, random attack and 
targeted attack. For random attack, the attacker chooses a 
node to disrupt at random. For targeted attack, the attacker 
has some information on how the nodes are linked to each 
other and will choose the most critical node for attack.
In a Scale-free network, when a new node joins the 
network, the probability that it will  attach to an existing node 
is proportional to the number of links that the node has. 
Hence, a  node with the most number of links is more likely to 
attract new node. Studies have shown that most real networks 
behave like the Scale-free network.
A Scale-free network is known to be resilient to random 
attack but is very vulnerable to targeted attack. This is because 
in a Scale-free network, there exist a  small number of critical 
nodes with many links. Hence, when the attackers pick a node 
at random, it is less likely that these critical nodes will be 
chosen. This intuitively explains the resilient response of the 
Scale-free network under random attack. However, these 
critical nodes have a great influence on the survivability of the 
entire network and when the attackers focus on the critical 
nodes, the Scale-free network will suffer a  serious 
consequence.
In Random network, nodes are attached to each other 
randomly. Hence, the response of a random network under 
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random attack is not much different from that of a targeted 
attack.
Thadakamalla et al  [2] proposed a network topology 
(herein known as UltraLog network) which is considered a 
hybrid between a Random network and a Scale-free network. 
It is suggested that the UltraLog model will be as efficient as 
the Scale-free network and yet perform better than the Scale-
free network under targeted attack.  
The UltraLog model is inherently hierarchical in nature. It 
consists of three layers, namely MSB, FSB and battalion. 
MSBs, FSBs and battalion enter the system in a certain ratio 
l:m:n where l > m > n:
a. A MSB has five edges pointing from it. 
b. A FSB has three edges pointing from it.
c. A battalion has one edge pointing from it and a 














Table 1: The configuration simulated during the workshop
Description of Scenario
In this workshop, we relaxed the ratio of MSBs, FSBs and 
battalion so that l ≥ m ≥ n. Table 1 shows the configurations 
studied during the workshop.
In addition to network configuration, we also modified 
the model so that there are four types of attack mode, namely 
random, targeted attack on critical node, targeted attack on 
critical node in largest component, targeted attack on critical 
node in smallest component. For more information on these 
attack modes, the readers can send the inquiry to the team.
We ran 30 replications of simulation for each 
configuration type and attack mode. After that, we compared 
the result with that of Scale-free and Random networks. The 
number of node used in each replication is 100 and one node 
is removed from the network at each time step. The 
simulation stops when 80% of the nodes are removed.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For each configuration and attack mode, we computed the 
average value of the characteristic path length and the 
largest component at each time step and plotted them on a 
graph. Figure 1 and 2 show how the characteristic path 
length and the largest component behave for the three 
network structures for a given configuration, under targeted 
attack on critical node.
Figure 1: The average characteristic path length 
at each time step under targeted attack on critical node
In figure 1, it is observed that the rate of increase of the 
characteristic path length of the Scale-free network is higher 
than that of the other network structures. Furthermore, the 
Scale-free network starts to disintegrate at earlier time unit 
(i.e. time step = 21). On the other hand, the UltraLog model 
performs better than the Scale-free network but lag behind the 
random network.
In figure 2, it is again observed that the Scale-free 
network performs the worst among the three networks. For 
the Scale-free network, the value of largest component drops 
at a faster rate than that of the other two networks. 
Figure 2: The average largest component 
at each time step under targeted attack on critical node
For each configuration and attack mode, we plotted the 
characteristic path length and the largest component for the 
three networks and made visual comparison. We developed a 
simple scoring system to assess the performance of the 
UltraLog network. The following criteria  are used to award 
score to the UltraLog network: 
a. Under random attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Random network and the 
Scale-free network, a score of 1 is given.
b. Under random attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Random network but lags 
behind the Scale-free network, a score of 1 is still 
given.
c. Under targeted attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better  than the Scale-free network and the 
Random network, a score of 1 is given.
d. Under targeted attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Scale-free network but lags 
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Red Boats
behind the Random network, a score of 1 is still 
given.
The result is shown in table 2. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Based on the simulations ran, we observed that the UltraLog 
model performs better under the following conditions:
1. It is good to have an equal number of MSB, FSB and 
Battalion but impractical due to high 
implementation cost.
2. A more practical approach is to have an equal 
number of FSB and Battalion.
3. We will not recommend an equal number of MSB 
and FSB
From these observations, a possible rule of thumb is as 
follows:
Nos. of FSB = Nos. of Battalion > Nos. of MSB
We must caution that these results are obtained from 
simulations ran during the workshop. It is necessary to check 
that these observations are true for other configurations that 
are not ran during the workshop. Furthermore, it will be good 
to perform the simulation for other network size. 
CONCLUSIONS
As conclusion, we found that this approach provide a “good 
enough” answer for a quick study and highlight some 
important trends in the result. The data-farming capability of 
NetLogo software allows the users to run multiple scenarios 
within reasonable time.
We also made the following improvements to the model:
a. Node recovery. In a  real network, a node will 
recover after a disruption. Hence, it will be more 
realistic to consider how a node will recover in the 
model. For the workshop, we have implemented a 
simple node recovery mechanism.
b. Node replenishment. When a supplier is disrupted, 
a customer will source for a new supplier. We have 
also implemented a simple replenishment policy 
that a node will look for new node to link to, after 
its supplying node fails.
c. Output analysis. Apart from the capability to run 
multiple scenarios, the next important step is to 
facilitate the analysis of this huge amount of 
simulation outputs. We implemented the analysis 
tool in VBA and Java.
REFERENCES
[1] The initial military supply chain Netlogo model is 
developed by Vidal J. M. and is downloadable from: 
http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/netlogomas/
[2] Thadakamalla et al. Survivability of Multiagent-Based 
Supply Networks: A Topological Perspective. IEEE 
Intelligent Systems, Sept / Oct 2004.
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During previous Project Albert and International data 
Farming Workshops (IDFW) and during discussions 
between Dstl and TNO, the suitability and feasibility of 
Agent Based Models (ABMs) to support research on Combat 
Identification (Combat ID) was examined. The objective of 
this research is to:
Investigate the effect of (a large number of) different 
variations in Situational Awareness, Situation 
Awareness (SA), Target Identification (Target ID), 
Human Factors, and Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (TTP) under different circumstances 
(scenarios) on mission level combat effectiveness and 
fratricide.
Combat ID is a complex phenomenon which is heavily based 
on human factors, technology and tactical considerations. 
Modeling Combat ID to its full extent is not possible in a 
single step. It requires both a good combat model and a 
representation of the Target Detection, Classification, 
Identification process that takes the considerations 
mentioned above into account. As a first step to support our 
objectives, we decided to evaluate the feasibility to represent 
Situation Awareness in an ABM. This evaluation was 
conducted during IDFW14. Before and during this 
workshop, version 1.0 was developed in NETLOGO. This 
model contains one moving identifying agent and a number 
of static agents to be identified (objects). The identifying 
agent has a representation of situation Awareness (SA) and 
bases its identification decision on a mechanism where it 
combines SA and data from observations.
Current Features and Objectives
Following our overall Master  plan, several extensions have 
been implemented since IDFW14:
1. When the identifying agent has not decided on the 
identity of a certain visited object, it is able to revisit 
the object and try to decide on its identity again.
2. When the agent decides that an object is an enemy, it 
kills the object. The object will then be removed from 
the ground truth.
3. The notion of Local SA and Global SA was introduced. 
Global SA keeps track of the pre-conception of the 
whole environment in which the agent operates. Its’ 
granularity is less than the granularity of the ground 
truth. Local SA keeps track of the agents’ 
preconception of its’ surrounding area. The 
granularity of Local SA is equal to the granularity of 
the ground truth. The size of the local SA and the 
granularity of the global SA are parameterized (and 
thus data farmable). The local SA is updated each time 
new sensor information is accepted or as a result of 
moving. When the agent moves, the local SA grids 
moves with it, keeping the agent in the middle of it. 
As a  result of the move, some cells will be removed 
from the local SA and new cells are added, taking the 
belief distribution of the global SA cell as its’ initial 
belief. The global SA is updated each time the agent 
decides on the identity of an object. Figure 1 shows the 
relation between the Local SA, the Global SA and the 
ground truth.
The objectives of the study during IDFW15 were to assess 
the features above by designing and conducting data farming 
experiments. Further objectives were to (re-)examine and 
determine the key factors (parameters) in SA. 
Figure 1: The notion of Local SA, Global SA 
and their intuitive interaction.
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Design of Experiments
During IDFW15 we identified the interaction between Local 
SA and Global SA, and the mechanism to accept or reject 
new sensor information as the key factors to consider. We 
implemented four model versions with different ways to 
deal with these factors:
version 1.The agent keeps track of the kind of objects that 
were encountered in each global cell. After a positive 
identification, the global SA cell where the object is 
identified, is updated in a way that depends on the kind 
of objects that were encountered in that cell before. If no 
or only the same kind of objects were encountered 
before, the global cell will get the agent’s local belief 
(probability distribution of Red, Blue, and Green). If one 
other kind was encountered before, it takes the average 
of the new belief and the old global belief. If two other 
kinds were encountered before, it takes the average of 
two times the old belief and one time the new belief.
version 2.The model incorporates a parameter "Belief 
Increase Steps" (BIS) to update the Global SA grid in 
steps towards a probability of 1 (100 percent sure). After 
a positive identification, the global SA is increased with 
“(1 -  ⅓) / BIS”. e.g. if BIS is 3, 0.22 is added. 
version 3.This version incorporates the notion of surprise. A 
parameter "Surprise Level" will be implemented that 
determines a surprise curve that defines the amount of 
belief that will  be added to the global belief when new 
information is accepted. The amount of belief to add, 
depends on the old belief in such a way that high old 
belief will add a low amount and vice versa (see Figure 
2). The effect is that new belief that is in line with the old 
belief, only has a small effect. If the new belief 
contradicts the old belief (surprise!), the global belief is 
changed more radically.
Figure 2: The surprise curve
version 4.This version uses the Surprise Variable as 
introduced in version 3. The shape of the “Information 
Acceptance” curves1  are parameterized, Both the top 
and the crossing with the Y-axe can be defined by the 
user. See Figure 2. This enables to shape the information 
acceptance behavior and in particular solves some 
problems with old belief that is equal to 0 or 1. 
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Table 1 : Overview of different model versions
Figure 3: The information Acceptance curves
RESULTS
The Measures of Merit for the combat ID model versions are 
the number of correct identifications, the number of 
misidentifications, and the number of fratricide incidents. 
During the workshop we briefly evaluated model versions 1 
and 2 and did runs with all four versions. 
For version 1, the main results were that:
• The Decision threshold turned out to be the key factor 
in determining the number of correct identifications. 
• Having a larger local SA grid size cannot overcome a 
perceived truth that differs greatly from the ground 
truth. 
• Decreasing the decision threshold increases the 
number of correct identifications and 
misidentifications
• Outlying cases proved interesting, specifically, the 
largest number of misidentifications occurred when 
there was a:
o Low decision threshold and, in general, a lower 
stress coefficient (which determines the 
information acceptance level)
o Large delta between perceived and ground truth
• The more interspersed the Blue, Red, and Green 
objects are, the more fratricide
• The higher the level of stress, the less fratricide   
same holds for version 4 , with information acceptance 
level
Figure 4: Regression tree for version 1 with relative number of 
correct identifications compared to total number of identifications
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1 The Information Acceptance curves were called stress curves before. This was actually misleading. The curves are really about the openness 
of the agent to accept new information, which can be effected by other factors than stress. However, in the results we sometimes still use the 
word stress.
During the workshop we agreed that different Measures 
of Effectiveness are needed to view the effects of all SA 
variables. Therefore, after the workshop, we combined the 
initial outputs to the relative number of correct identifications:
• The number of correct identifications related to the 
total number of identifications. This MoE directly 
relates the number of correct identifications to the 
number of misidentifications. 
• The number of correct identifications related to the 
total number of existing objects. This MoE directly 
shows the agents performance in identifying objects 
(correctly).
Using these two MoE we created the regression trees 
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 to determine the most 
important factors for version 1.
Figure 5: Regression tree for version 1 with relative number of 
correct identifications compared to total number of objects.
Figure 6 shows the contour plot for the two most 
important factors, decision threshold and level of stress, 
related to the number of correct identifications.
Figure 6: Number of correct identifications related to decision 
threshold and level of stress (information acceptance level)
For version 2, the main results were that:
• A higher resolution global SA (smaller cell  size) can 
reduce the fratricide incidents, in case where the tank 
detection range is large
• Having a Large local SA decreases the number of 
misidentifications at a low classification range, but 
increases the number of misidentifications at large 
ranges
Further version results:
• Version 2: The regression trees for version 2 are not 
significantly different from the ones for version 3
• Version 2: There are no significant effects caused by 
the variable “Belief Increase Steps” introduced in 
version 2
• Version 3: The regression trees for version 3 are not 
significantly different from the ones for version 1 and 
2
• Version 3: There are no significant effects caused by 
the variable “Surprise Level” introduced in version 3 
(Note: at a higher Surprise level there seems to be a 
rise in Mis-Identifications. This needs further 
examination!)
• Version 4: In general, the higher the information 
acceptance level, meaning the more open the agent is 
for new information, the higher the number of correct 
identifications, and the less the number of 
misidentifications and fratricide incidents. 
• Version 4: The regression tree of all variables related to 
the number of fratricide incidents is shown in Figure 
7.
Figure 7: Version 4: Regression Tree 
regarding the number of fratricide incidents
• Version 4: A contour plot of the Y-Intercept (where the 
curve crosses the Y-axe) and the Information 
Acceptance Level related to the number of correct 
identification (relative to the number of the total 
number of identifications) is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Contour plot Y-Intercept and 
Information Acceptance Level
CONCLUSIONS
We can draw the conclusion that team 8 made a lot of 
progress with the model development. We were able to 
discuss, implement, and run 4 model versions. Discussions 
about Situational Awareness, and how to capture and 
represent it in our model raised further issues that might 
lead to new features. 
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However, our analysis is far from complete yet. At this 
moment we gained a number of insights from the results of 
our first data farming efforts. Some of them in line with our 
expectation, others in contradiction with it. This needs 
further analysis and possibly more model changes and 
model runs. 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
Before the next workshop, we will dive deeper into the 
ocean of data to pinpoint more characteristics of our current 
versions. In the process of sowing and reaping, we will 
incorporate lessons learned and reconsider our model and 
assumptions continuously. We have an master plan that will 
serve as a guide for our near term development. Together 
with the lessons learned from the IDFW 15, we (re)consider 
current variables and new variables like:
• Other Measures of Merit
• The notion of Surprise
• Similarity of objects
• Environmental (~ sensor) distortions
• Further incorporation of INCIDER aspects 
• Continuous Info Processing
• Change of awareness over time
• Notion of killing enemy and preconception
• BDI and awareness of fratricide
• Threat representation
• Incorporation of moving objects
• Incorporation of more identifying agents
IDFW16 in Monterey will serve as a vehicle to test some 
of the ideas mentioned above. Our plan is to have a stable 
model and focus on the datafarming process during this 
workshop. As usual we welcome new members to participate 
in our team during this workshop. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Clustering and Outlier Analysis for Data Mining 
(COADM) tool is one of the three key components delivered 
under the Systematic Data Farming (SDF) project [1].  SDF 
was sponsored by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
Centre for Military Experimentation (SCME) and was 
completed in 2005.   
OBJECTIVE
The objective of COADM is to provide an additional 
dimension to data analysis, especially when there is a large 
amount of output generated through data farming.   It aims 
to complement statistical analysis by grouping the data into 
“good” and “bad” clusters, and identifying the associated 
parameters so as to provide insights on how to get into 
“good” clusters and avoid the “bad” ones.  COADM also 
identifies the outliers in each cluster, and in doing so try to 
discover “surprises”. 
Figure 1: Key Features of COADM
KEY FEATURES
Figure 1 shows the key features of COADM and the 
underlying techniques and algorithms used.
The Clustering Analysis was based on K-Means 
methodology coupled with Self-Organising Maps (SOM) to 
help organise the data into clusters.  The incorporation of K-
means was to help improve the clustering and segregation 
capability of the SOM [2].
Based on the Clusters identified, a search was carried 
out within to identify the points that are “most different” 
from the rest of the data  points within the same cluster, i.e. 
the outliers.  This was achieved by comparing the Euclidean 
Distance of each data  point with its k-nearest neighbour in 
each cluster and finding the one with the largest Euclidean 
Distance [3].
COADM was developed from several open source 
software packages and DSO contributions were in 
synthesizing the various algorithms/packages to form a 
package (coded in JAVA) capable of extracting information 
from numerical data sets.  The SOM program used in this 
package was derived from the SOM toolbox in Matlab [3]. 
This toolbox is capable of visualizing complex data set, 
courtesy of Matlab’s great visualization tools; moreover it 
keeps track of much information which greatly facilitates the 
data mining process.  The outlier algorithm was coded and 
modified slightly for integration with other packages.  There 
is also a WEKA package provided as an extra data 




An Urban Scenario was used to demonstrate the key 
features of COADM (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Urban Scenario Setup in MANA
An Urban Area of Operations (AO) 2km by 2km in size 
was set up in MANA.  The scenario was set in this Urban 
AO where 2 platoons of Blue Infantry soldiers (21 soldiers 
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1 For more information contact: Choo Chwee Seng, cchweese@dso.org.sg
per platoon), each platoon was supported by 3 MG-mounted 
soft-skin vehicles, attempted to take over a Key Installation 
(KIN) held by a platoon of Red  Infantry soldiers (21 
soldiers).  The Red Infantry defence was assisted by two 
teams of Red snipers (4 snipers in total).  The Blue agents’ 
task was made more difficult by the crowd of hostile 
Civilians congregating near to the KIN and randomly 
attacking the Blue agents when they were encountered.
Blue Force has 3 Courses of Actions: 
d. OCA 1.  The Blue agents advanced from the 
northwest and southwest direction of the map 
towards the objective, attempting to take out the 
Red from both sides.
e. OCA 2.  The Blue agents were concentrated in the 
southeast area of the map and advance as a force 
towards the Red, attempting to punch through the 
Red defence from a single direction.
f. OCA 3.  The Blue agents were spread out on the 
northern portion of the map and attempted to 
flush out the read through a swarming approach. 
Red Force has 2 Courses of Actions: 
g. ECA 1 - All Red agents resided within the 
building’s compound and defended their base 
from there.
h. ECA 2.  A section minus of 6 Red agents lay hidden 
in an adjacent building as backup to the other two 
sections in the defended locality.  They were called 
in when the Red agents came in contact with Blue 
Forces.
Design of Experiment
A hybrid design was formed using the Excel-based Latin 
Hypercube (LHC) Generator by crossing the 30-factor LHC 
with the 2-factor Full  Factorial design for the OCA and 
ECA factors.  The resultant hybrid design had 6000 design 
points and sent for data farming (with 100 replications 
each).
Analysis of Results
The large dataset of MOEs obtained from the data-
farming output was analyzed using COADM and some 
interesting insights were derived.  Figure 3 shows some of 
the selected component plots of the SOM clusters generated 
by the COADM.  Similar distribution of colours on the 
component plots implies correlation.  Hence correlation 
between the factors and the MOEs can be discovered.  Factors 
found to be correlated to MOEs are also the main factors 
contributing to the MOEs.
Both the OCA and ECA factors were observed to be 
uncorrelated with the MOEs.  The distribution patterns of the 
OCA and ECA factors (shown on Figure 3) were observed to 
be rather independent from the distribution patterns of the 
MOEs.  Hence, varying the OCA and ECA would not 
contribute to significant changes to the MOEs.
Figure 3: Component Plots of SOM clusters 
for selected  Factors and MOEs
The MOEs were observed to be somewhat correlated. 
This suggested that achieving high Red attrition would likely 
coincide with high Blue and Civilian attrition levels.  The Red 
and Civilian casualties were more closely correlated with 
each other compared with that of the Blue casualties. 
Therefore, it would suggest that larger number of civilian 
casualties was unavoidable in this scenario, if the Blue agents 
or Red agents attempted to maximize the casualties on either 
sides.  
However, there were exceptions.  A region that 
contained outcomes that corresponded to moderate Blue 
attrition but very high Red attrition was shown in Figure 4. 
This would be the region of most interest to Blue as the 
parameter values defined in this region allowed Blue to 
achieve its mission of killing as many Red as possible, while 
incurring moderate losses.
Figure 4: Region of Outcomes corresponding 
to Moderate Blue Attrition but Very High Red Attrition
Of the 32 farming parameters, it was observed that 
“Blue Infantry Tendency to Charge at KIN” and “Blue 
Infantry Squad Aggression Level” correlate most closely 
with the MOEs, and were hence most influential on the MOE 
outcomes.  
It was interesting to revisit the region spotted under 
Figure 4, where Blue suffered moderate attrition but Red 
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suffered high attrition.  As shown in Figure 5, in this region, 
the parameter values for “Blue Infantry Tendency to Charge 
at KIN” and “Blue Infantry Aggression Level” should define 
the Blue’s behavior that would inflict high Red attrition 
while sustaining moderate Blue attrition.
Figure 5: Comparison of Blue Inf Tendency to Charge at KIN, 
Blue Inf Squad Aggression Level, and Total Blue Killed
COADM tool revealed that the data points can be 
organized into 20 clusters (see Figure 6).  The mean 
parameter values and MOEs for each cluster were obtained 
based on the data points within the cluster.  By analyzing 
each cluster, it can identify the clusters that contained 
generally favorable outcomes for Blue and those that 
contained generally bad outcomes for Blue.  
Figure 6: Clustering of Data Farming Output
COADM can also identify contributing factors and behavior 
that resulted in each of these clusters.  Without going into 
each cluster in detail, with this analysis, Blue would know 
how to manipulate Blue factors and make decisions to 
avoid those bad clusters and shift towards the good 
clusters.
From the output generated by COADM, the outlier 
points were examined in greater detail and they were laid 
out in Table 1 in terms of the MOEs.  The top outlier was case 
number 5921 (or Data Point 5921) amongst the 6000 cases in 
the Experimental Design.  This case belonged to Cluster 3 
and had 23.45 Red killed in total.  COADM identified this 
case as an outlier because 23.45 red killed was 1.936 times 
more than Cluster  3’s mean value of total Red killed.  A 
value that is 1.5 times either side of the mean would 
normally be considered as an outlier.
In Cluster 3, Blue generally suffers high attrition and 
hence Blue should avoid parameter values that will cause 
them to fall  into this cluster.  This outlier Case 5921 is an 
interesting case because it is the best outcome in a bad cluster 
for the Blue, as Blue was able to inflict much higher Red 
attrition compared to other cases in Cluster 3.
Case 5921 described a Blue force that was very fast, 
highly aggressive and extremely stealthy.  Although the Red 
force and Civilians were also generally aggressive, they were 
less so compared to the Blue force.
Hence, if factors uncontrollable by the Blue Force, such 
as Red Force tactics and behavior,  resulted in the 
circumstances becoming unfavourable (e.g. falling into 
Cluster 3 outcomes), Blue force must attempt to exploit 
outlier case 5921 by moving swiftly and stealthily, and 
engaging more aggressively than the Red force inflict high 
Red casualties.
Table 1: MOEs in Outlier Cases
INSTALLATION
The installation requirements for COADM are as follows:
a. Java 1.4.2 and above.
b. Windows OS 2000/XP.
c. Memory recommended, 256MB Ram.
d. Disk storage space for files, 260MB
To request a  copy of COADM, please contact Choo 
Chwee Seng at cchweese@dso.org.sg. 
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 International Data Farming Workshop 16 
When: 13 - 18 April 2008
Where: Portola Plaza Hotel, Monterey, California
Hotel information available at (http://www.portolaplazahotel.com) 
Reservations: 866-711-1534
Note: Details on room rates and how to make reservations will be announced soon. Please go to 
http://harvest.nps.edu/ at the IDFW 16 link for additional information and registration.
The Early Bird workshop fee, good through 29 February, will be is $496, 
afterwards the standard fee will be $550. 
Tentative Agenda 
Sunday, April 13: Opening reception and dinner at 1800 at the Portola Plaza
Monday, April 14: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Thursday, April 15 - 17: Work in teams (optional plenary sessions in the mornings) at NPS
Friday, April 18: Outbriefs and Closing Ceremony in the morning at the Portola Plaza 
Call for Team 
Leaders / Plenary 
Speakers: 
Please email 
gehorne@nps.edu with your 
choice of teams and if you 
want to lead a team or 
present a plenary briefing. 
Conference Fee: 
The registration fee is $550 (Early Bird Registartion by February 29 is $496 US). 
Registration pays for: 
• Conference rooms•  Opening dinner
• Lunch, Break food and drinks •  CD & conference materials
• New one-year membership card with quote•  Fun
The Data Farming CD/DVD, if provided, 
will be attached here. For additional 
copies of the CD or of the Scythe please 
contact Ted Meyer 
(tedmeyer@mac.com)

